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Abstract—We consider the uplink of a cellular massive MIMO
network. Since the spectral efficiency of these networks is limited
by pilot contamination, the pilot allocation across cells is of
paramount importance. However, finding efficient pilot reuse
patterns is non-trivial especially in practical asymmetric base
station deployments. In this paper, we approach this problem
using coalitional game theory. Each cell has its own unique pilots
and can form coalitions with other cells to gain access to more
pilots. We develop a low-complexity distributed algorithm and
prove convergence to an individually stable coalition structure.
Simulations reveal fast algorithmic convergence and substantial
performance gains over one-cell coalitions and full pilot reuse.
I. INTRODUCTION
Massive MIMO (multiple-input, multiple-output) technol-
ogy has over the last few years emerged from a theoretical
concept [1] to a key solution for future wireless networks [2].
This is because it can improve the sum spectral efficiency
(bit/s/Hz/cell) of cellular networks by orders of magnitude [3],
without the need for more spectrum or more base stations
(BSs). In massive MIMO, each BS is equipped with an array
of hundreds of active antennas, which are processed coherently
to improve the signal quality in the uplink and downlink [4].
Massive MIMO systems require channel state information
(CSI) at the BSs, for example, to separate uplink signals sent
in parallel by different user equipments (UEs). CSI is acquired
from uplink pilot signaling. The pilot sequences are precious
resources in cellular networks since accurate CSI estimation
requires low interference during pilot transmission (i.e., low
so-called pilot contamination [5]). Contemporary networks
have an over-provision of pilots—many more orthogonal pilots
than active UEs per cell—thus pilot contamination is essen-
tially alleviated by allocating the pilots at random. In contrast,
massive MIMO networks attempt to schedule as many users
as possible to achieve a high sum spectral efficiency (SE) [3].
An efficient and robust way to mitigate pilot contamination
is fractional pilot reuse, where only a subset of the pilot
resources are utilized in each cell [3], [6], [7]. This is con-
ceptually simple in symmetric networks (e.g., one-dimensional
cases as in [7] or two-dimensional cases with hexagonal cells
as in [3], [6]); one can color the cells in a symmetric pattern
and divide the pilots so that only cells with the same color use
the same subset. The pilot clustering in practical asymmetric
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deployments, where every cell has a unique shape, is non-
trivial and must be optimized for each particular deployment.
The purpose of this paper is to use game theory to develop an
algorithm for adaptive pilot clustering, which can be applied
in cellular networks with arbitrary asymmetric cell geometries.
Coalitional game models offer structured mechanisms to
find cooperation between decision makers (players). A charac-
teristic of these mechanisms is their natural implementability
in a distributed way. With such merits, coalitional game theory
has found many applications in communication networks;
see the tutorial [8]. A class of coalitional games, called the
partition form [9], takes into account the dependencies of the
players’ utility functions on the overall partition of players into
distinct coalitions, called coalition structure. The application of
such game models to determine which BSs (players) cooperate
with each other is appropriate in this paper as the performance
of each cell depends on the whole coalition structure.
The solution of a coalitional game in partition form is a
coalition structure with specified stability requirements. The
stability requirements are generally related to the feasible
transitions from one coalition structure to another. One model
of stability, called individual stability, restricts a single player
to move from one coalition to another [10]. Such models,
which we utilize in this paper, have been applied for channel
sensing and access in cognitive radio [11] and for coalition
formation in the MIMO interference channel [12].
In this paper, we assume that each BS has a set of unique
pilot sequences. We propose a distributed mechanism to find
the sets of BSs that cooperate to gain access to each others’
pilots and thereby serve more UEs. A set of BSs have the
incentive to cooperate whenever the larger number of UEs that
can be scheduled in their cells leads to an improvement in their
individual per-cell average SE. Our mechanism is a coalition
formation algorithm which converges to an individually stable
coalition structure under what we define as searching budget
constraints. In doing so, the complexity of the algorithm is
controlled. Simulation results reveal fast convergence of the
algorithm giving considerable performance gains over one-cell
coalitions and full pilot reuse.
II. SYSTEM MODEL & SUM SPECTRAL EFFICIENCY
We consider the uplink of a cellular massive MIMO net-
work with L cells, each associated with an index in the set
L = {1, . . . , L}. BS j is equipped with an array of M antennas
and serves Kj UEs. The transmission is divided into frames
of Tc seconds and Wc Hz, such that channel between each UE
and BS has a constant channel response within a frame, but is
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Fig. 1. Illustration of a massive MIMO network with L cells and wrap-
around. Each cell contains a BS with M antennas and the colors indicate
clusters of cells that use the same pilots.
different between frames. Consequently, each frame contains
S = TcWc transmission symbols. In each uplink frame, B
symbols are allocated for pilot signaling and the remaining
S−B symbols are used for uplink data. The B pilot symbols
permit B orthogonal pilot sequences; that is, only B UEs
in the entire network can transmit pilots without interfering
with each other. In this paper, we study how the L cells can
share these pilots to maximize the average sum SE. Since pilot
contamination is mainly a problem in highly loaded networks,
we assume that there is at least B potential UEs per cell—it
is up to each BS to decide how many of them that are active.
Each cell is given a fraction BL of unique pilot sequences,
where BL for convenience is assumed to be an integer. BS j
can keep its BL pilots by itself and serve Kj =
B
L UEs without
any pilot contamination. Alternatively, it can form a coalition
with other cells to share the access to each others’ pilots.
Definition 1 (Coalition structure). A coalition structure C is
a partition of L, the grand coalition, into a set of disjoint
coalitions {S1, . . . ,SN} with
⋃N
n=1 Sn=L and
⋂N
n=1 Sn=∅.
For example, let Φj(C) denote the coalition in C that BS j
belongs to. The coalition members have access to BL |Φj(C)|
pilots, where |·| denotes the cardinality of a set. Then, BS j can
serve Kj = BL |Φj(C)| UEs, but the drawback is that the cells
in the coalition contaminate each others’ pilot transmissions.
Fig. 1 gives an example of a cellular network with L = 16
cells in an area with vertical and horizontal wrap-around. The
cells have formed four coalitions: green, yellow, red, and blue.
Since each coalition has four members, each BS has access to
B
4 pilots and serves
B
4 UEs in each frame. Pilot contamination
is only caused between cells with the same color.
A. Average Uplink Spectral Efficiency
The coalition formation is based on maximizing the SE in
each cell. The vast majority of SE expressions for massive
MIMO assumes that each BS serves the same number of UEs
(cf. [1], [3], [13]). In contrast, the BSs may form coalitions of
different sizes and thus serve unequal numbers of UEs herein.
We now generalize the SE expressions from [3] to handle this.
The UEs are randomly distributed in the serving cell. In a
certain frame, suppose that zlk ∈ R2 is the position of the kth
UE in cell l. The channel response hjlk ∈ CM between this
UE and BS j is modeled as Rayleigh fading:
hjlk ∼ CN
(
0, dj(zlk)IM
)
, (1)
where IM is the M × M identity matrix. The function
dj(z) gives the variance of the channel attenuation from a
UE position z to BS j. The value of dj(zlk) is known at
BS j. The UEs apply power control with the purpose of
achieving uniform performance and avoid near-far blockage.
More precisely, the UE at location zjk uses a transmit power
of ρ/dj(zjk) per symbol, where ρ is a design parameter. The
resulting signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at any antenna at the
serving BS is ρ/σ2, where σ2 is the noise variance.
Orthogonal pilots are used within each cell, while the
kth UE of each cell in a coalition uses the same pilot.
By correlating the received signals with corresponding pilot
sequences [13], the received pilot signal ypilotjk ∈ CM at BS j
for its UE k is
ypilotjk =
∑
l∈Φj(C)
√
ρ
dl(zlk)
Bhjlk+ηjk, k = 1, . . . ,Kj , (2)
where ηjk ∼ CN (0, σ2IM ) is additive noise. Notice that there
is only interference from one UE per cell in the coalition
Φj(C), and no interference from other coalitions. Based on
ypilotjk , BS j computes the MMSE estimate of hjjk [3]:
hˆjjk =
√
ρdj(zjk)B∑
`∈Φj(C)
ρdj(z`k)
d`(z`k)
B + σ2
ypilotjk . (3)
During uplink data transmission, all BSs are active and the
received signal yj ∈ CM at BS j is
ydataj =
L∑
l=1
Kl∑
k=1
√
ρ
dl(zlk)
hjlkxlk + nj , (4)
where xlk ∈ C is the symbol transmitted by UE k in cell
l. This signal is normalized as E{|xlk|2} = 1, while the
corresponding UL transmit power is ρdl(zlk) , as defined earlier.
The additive noise is modeled as nj ∼ CN (0, σ2IM ).
Linear receive combining is used in massive MIMO to
separate each UE’s signal from the interfering signals. BS j
selects a combining vector gjk ∈ CM for each of its Kj UEs
and multiply it with the received signals in (4), as gHjky
data
j , to
obtain an effective scalar signal. Let Hˆj = [hˆjj1 . . . hˆjjKj ] ∈
CM be the estimated channels in cell j. Two typical combining
schemes are maximum ratio combining (MRC), which obtains
the highest signal gain by setting
[gMRCj1 . . . g
MRC
jKj ] = Hˆj , (5)
and zero-forcing combining (ZFC) where the pseudo-inverse
of Hˆj is used to suppress intra-cell interference:
[gZFCj1 . . . g
ZFC
jKj ] = (Hˆ
H
j Hˆj)
−1Hˆj . (6)
The following theorem provides an average sum SE in the
cells with MRC and ZFC, and generalizes previous results in
[3] for equal number of UEs per cell.
IMRCj (C) =
∑
l∈Φj(C)\{j}
(
µ
(2)
jl +
µ
(2)
jl −
(
µ
(1)
jl
)2
M
)
+
(∑
S∈C
∑
l∈S
µ
(1)
jl
B|S|
L
+
σ2
ρ
)( ∑
l∈Φj(C)
µ
(1)
jl +
σ2
Bρ
M
)
(7)
IZFCj (C) =
∑
l∈Φj(C)\{j}
(
µ
(2)
jl +
µ
(2)
jl −
(
µ
(1)
jl
)2
M − B|Φj(C)|L
)
+
∑
S∈C
∑
l∈S
µ
(1)
jl
B|S|
L
−
∑
l∈Φj(C)
(µ
(1)
jl )
2B|Φj(C)|
L∑
`∈Φj(C)
µ
(1)
j` +
σ2
Bρ
+
σ2
ρ

( ∑
l∈Φj(C)
µ
(1)
jl +
σ2
Bρ
M − B|Φj(C)|L
)
(8)
Theorem 1. For a given coalition structure C, a lower bound
on the average ergodic sum capacity in cell j is
Uj(C) =
(
1− B
S
)
B
L
|Φj(C)| log2
(
1 +
1
Ischemej (C)
)
, (9)
where the interference term Ischemej is given in (7) for MRC
and in (8) for ZFC (both at the top of the page). The following
propagation parameters appear in these expressions:
µ
(γ)
jl = Ezlm
{(
dj(zlm)
dl(zlm)
)γ}
for γ = 1, 2. (10)
Proof: The proof is along the lines of the proofs of
Lemma 2 and Th. 1 in [3] and are omitted for breviety.
The factor (1 − BS ) in (9) is the pilot signaling overhead,
while second factor is the number of active UEs in cell
j: Kj = BL |Φj(C)|. The interference terms IMRCj (C) and
IZFCj (C) have intuitive interpretations. The first part in both
expressions is the pilot contamination and is only impacted by
the cells that have formed a coalition with BS j. The second
part is the conventional inter-user interference (from all cells).
MRC suppresses this part by the full array gain of M , while
ZFC cancels out part of the interference and suppresses the
remaining interference by a reduced array gain of M −Kj .
The parameter µ(1)jl in (10) is the average ratio between the
channel variance to BS j and the channel variance to BS l,
for a UE in cell l. Along with its second-order moments, µ(2)jl ,
these parameters characterize the network topology. Notice
that µ(1)jj = µ
(2)
jj = 1, while the values get smaller as further
cell j and cell l are apart. In general, µ(1)jl 6= µ(1)lj for j 6= l.
The average sum SE Uj(C) in (9), the utility function of
BS j in the remainder of this paper, should preferably be as
large as possible1. There are thus L utilities which depend
on the combining scheme (e.g., MRC or ZFC) and on the
coalition structure C. Since the number of possible coalition
structures equals the Lth Bell number, which has a faster
growth than exponential with L, finding a globally optimal
pilot assignment is hard. Therefore, we formulate next the
design problem as a coalitional game to provide a distributed
and efficient algorithm.
1Note that maximizing the sum SE might lead to operating points with
many active users and low SE per user, but this is still beneficial for all users
as compared to time-sharing where each user is only active part of time but
exhibit a higher SE when being active.
III. COALITIONAL GAME
Cooperation between the BSs can be analyzed using coali-
tional games [14]. Since the average SE of each cell, given in
Theorem 1, depends on the coalition structure (Definition 1),
we need to study the coalitional game in partition form [9],
which we formulate by the tuple 〈L, (qj)j∈L, (U˜j)j∈L〉. Here,
the set of players corresponds to the set of BSs L. Each player
in L is endowed with searching budget qk ∈ N which limits
the number of searches he can perform to find a coalition to
join. The utility of a player j is formulated to be
U˜j(C, ηj) =
{
Uj(C) if ηj ≤ qj
0 otherwise
, (11)
which is specified by its SE Uj whenever a player j has not
exhausted its searching budget qj where ηj ∈ N represents the
number of searches player j has already performed.
From Theorem 1, the utility of cell j depends on which
members are in its coalition Φj(C) through the pilot contami-
nation term as well as the interference term determined by the
structure of the coalitions forming outside Φj(C). Therefore,
so-called externalities exist. Specifically, our game belongs to
the category of negative externalities, since the merging of
coalitions reduces the utility of all coalitions not involved in
the merging due to the increased number of scheduled users
and thereby the increased interference.
We adopt the game theoretic assumptions which implies that
each player’s behavior follows the maximization of his utility
based on the discovery of profitable opportunities [14]. Such
behavior is important for distributed coalition formation which
we specify and discuss next.
A. Coalition Formation
Coalition formation represents the dynamics which lead to
stable coalition structures. We use a coalition formation model
from [10] in which a single player is allowed to leave its
coalition and join another.
Definition 2 (Deviation). A cell j ∈ L leaves its current
coalition Φj(C) to join coalition S ∈ C∪{∅}. In doing so, the
coalition structure C changes to CS . We capture this change
in the coalition structure by the notation CS j←− C.
According to individual stability [10], a deviation is admis-
sible if a player strictly improves his performance by leaving
its coalition to join another coalition. In addition, the members
of the coalition which he joins should not reduce their utility.
Definition 3 (Admissible deviation). A deviation CS j←− C
is admissible if U˜j(CS , ηj) > U˜j(C, ηj), and U˜k(CS , ηk) ≥
U˜k(C, ηk), for all k ∈ S.
The requirement imposed through the admissible deviation
is suitable in our setting due to the fact that each cell
exclusively owns a set of pilots. Thus, any BS which wants
to join a coalition by sharing its pilots with its members must
first ask their permission.
Based on the player’s deviation model, we utilize the
following stability concept defined in [10].
Definition 4 (Individual stability). A coalition structure C is
individually stable if there exists no j ∈ L and coalition S
such that deviation CS j←− C is admissible.
The coalition formation algorithm which leads to individ-
ually stable coalition structures is described in Algorithm 1.
The coalition structure is initialized with singleton coalitions,
corresponding to the noncooperative state in which no pilots
are shared between the cells. Note that the algorithm can be
initialized with any coalition structure. A BS j is selected at
random to check if a deviation is profitable. Based on the
local knowledge of the current coalition structure Ct and the
propagation parameters, BS j can calculate its utility in (11)
if it joins other coalitions. Then, BS j selects a coalition
at random in which it would profit by joining (Line 3) and
asks its members for permission to join (Line 4). Here, we
assume that the BSs are able to communicate and exchange
such application-type messages. Each BS in a coalition can
calculate its utility locally for the case the asking BS enters
the coalition. In Line 5, the number of searches by BS j
is incremented. If the deviation is admissible (Definition 3),
then it joins the coalition (Line 7) and the coalition structure
changes accordingly (Line 8). Coalition formation stops when
no deviations take place anymore.
Theorem 2. Algorithm 1 converges to an individually stable
coalition structure with an upper bound on the number of
deviations as t ≤∑j∈L qj .
Proof: The convergence of Algorithm 1 is guaranteed due
to the searching budget incorporated in the utility function
in (11) leading to t ≤ ∑j∈L qj . The stability result follows
from iterating over all deviation opportunities until individual
stability (Definition 4) is satisfied.
IV. SIMULATIONS
In the simulations, we consider S = 400 transmission
symbols (e.g., Tc = 4 ms and Wc = 100 kHz), SNR = ρσ2
= 5 dB, and a pathloss exponent of 3. Each BS owns 10 pilot
sequences that are orthogonal to the pilots of all other BSs.
Accordingly, we set the total number of pilots as B = 10L
with L being the number of BSs. For coalition formation, the
searching budget of BS j is set to qj = 100 for all j ∈ L. We
obtain the average performance from 103 uniformly random
BS deployments with uniform user distributions in each cell
and a wrap-around topology, as exemplified in Fig. 1.
Algorithm 1 Coalition formation algorithm.
Initilize: t = 0, C0 = {{1}, . . . , {K}}, ηj = 0, j ∈ L
1: repeat
2: for all BSs j ∈ L do
3: for all S ∈ Ct s.t. U˜j(CSt , ηj) > U˜j(Ct, ηj) do
4: Ask members of S for permission to join;
5: Increment searching factor ηj = ηj + 1;
6: if deviation CSt j←− Ct is admissible then
7: Leave Φj(Ct) and join S;
8: Update Ct+1 = CSt ;
9: t = t+ 1;
10: Go to Line 2;
11: until No cell deviates
In Fig. 2, the average SE with MRC is plotted for different
number of antennas at the BSs. Two scenarios are selected
for which we ensure the same BS density of 25 BSs per
km2 by appropriately choosing the region area the cells are
deployed in. For L = 7, finding the optimal coalition structure
by exhaustive search is computationally possible. The other
scenario is for L = 20 BSs. The associated performance using
the ZFC scheme in the same scenarios is provided in Fig. 3.
From Fig. 2, the performance of coalition formation and
the grand coalition (i.e., all BSs use all pilot resources) can
be observed to be close to optimal in the case of 7 cells. The
grand coalition outperforms the proposed coalition formation
in the case of 7 cells when M > 600. Though the practical
range of M is less than 500, the intersection point of the grand
coalition and coalition formation curves generally depends on
the choice of B. For fixed B, the high performance of the
grand coalition with very large M can be explained through
the vanishing interference terms in the utility functions in
Theorem 1. Consequently, it is efficient to schedule as many
UEs as possible in all cells, achieved by the grand coalition,
in order to maximize the pre-log term in the average SE
expression when M is very large. In the ZFC scheme in
Fig. 3 for L = 7, the grand coalition is more efficient than
the proposed coalition formation when M > 800 for similar
reasons. Here, it is observed that noncooperation outperforms
the grand coalition with ZFC when the available degrees of
freedom are small. In the case of 20 cells in which B = 200,
coalition formation provides performance gains compared to
the other schemes in the selected range of M .
The corresponding average coalition sizes for the plots in
Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 are shown in Fig. 4. Similar average coalition
sizes can be observed for the same number of BSs for MRC
and ZFC. Evidently, the grand coalition is rarely reached with
coalition formation. The complexity of coalition formation
is reflected by the average number of searches by the BSs
illustrated in Fig. 5. This number is incremented in Line 5 in
Algorithm 1. Although, we set the searching budget to 100 in
the simulations, the average number of searches is very low
and about a quarter of the number of BSs. This measure does
not show significant dependence on the number of antennas.
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Fig. 2. Average spectral efficiency with MRC at the BSs.
V. CONCLUSION
A distributed algorithm was proposed for pilot allocation
in the uplink of cellular massive MIMO networks of arbitrary
shape. By assuming that each cell has a few unique pilots and
can form coalitions with other cells to share pilot resources,
a coalitional game in partition form was formulated. Each
BS wants to maximize the average SE in its cell, taking
pilots, CSI quality, and interference into account. The proposed
mechanism has low complexity and provides performance
gains compared to one-cell coalitions and full pilot reuse
schemes. The solution is applicable also in the downlink, by
capitalizing on uplink-downlink duality [3]. Future work will
further analyze the performance dependencies on the total pilot
budget as well as on the number of cells and their geometries.
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